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Although Russia is widely associated with Orthodox
Christianity, it accommodates almost 15 million Mus-
lims in its federally organized state. The major Islam-
ic enclaves of the Russian Federation are situated in
the Volga-Urals and the North Caucasus. Following
the fall of Communism Russia's Islamic regions have
experienced a revival of Islam, enhanced by ideolog-
ical voids, centrifugal political processes and the
shifting sands of civil society. The autonomous re-
publics of Tatarstan in the Volga-Urals and Dagestan
in the North Caucasus exemplify two distinctive
models of a relationship between Islam and power in
the post-Communist u m m a. The following draws on
the findings of a three-year research project funded
by the Economic and Social Research Council (UK)
entitled 'Islam, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Post-So-
viet Tatarstan and Dagestan'.
Islam and Power 
in Post-Communist
Islamic Russia
In spite of the official separation between
the state and religion, as declared by the
1992 Constitution, the Shaimiev govern-
ment supported de facto an increasing role
for Islam in Tatar politics. It perceived the
DUMRT as an indispensable attribute of
Tatarstan's sovereignty and national distinc-
t i v e n e s s . In February 1998 Tatarstan officials
orchestrated the unifying congress of
Tatarstan Muslims and promoted Gusman
Iskhakov as the mufti of Tatarstan. Since
then the government has discreetly sup-
ported Mufti Iskhakov's policy aimed at
making Kazan the Islamic capital of Eurasia
and centralizing Tatarstan's Islamic commu-
nities under the DUMRT's auspices in oppo-
sition to the Ufa Mufti Talgat Tadjuddinov.
In July 1999 the authorities adopted a new
law on 'The Freedom of Consciousness and
Religious Formations', recognizing the
DUMRT as the only legitimate Islamic ad-
ministration in the republic. The formal dis-
play of loyalty has allowed Mufti Iskhakov to
enhance his personal power and to place his
relatives and associates in the major local Is-
lamic administrations of Tatarstan. He also
introduced new registration rules for Islamic
communities which rendered the status of
Mufti Talgat Tadjuddinov's followers illegal. 
In addition to forging special relations
with the m u f t i y a t, Tatarstan authorities have
promoted Islamic themes in official sym-
bols, architecture, monuments and design.
The strengthening of the symbolic function
of Islam has been accompanied by some at-
tempts to revive its ideological function. To
this end the leading Tatar official ideologist,
R. Khakimov, has advocated the restoration
of Tatar reformist Islam or Jadidism as a vi-
able basis for the Tatar national ideas. He in-
troduced the concept of EuroIslam, de-
scribed as a neo-Jadidism, which would ar-
guably permit the resolution of the appar-
ently inevitable conflict between formally
Muslim Tatarstan and allegedly Islamopho-
bic Europe. 
On the whole, however, the impact of
Islam on Tatarstan's official politics has been
more symbolic than genuine. Islam has been
regarded as a vital component of Tatarness
while Tatarstan society has remained over-
whelmingly secular. As for the religious Is-
lamic revival, it has been weak and has had
only a marginal impact on political and pub-
lic life. 
D a g e s t a n
In Dagestan the influence of Islam in the
policy-making process has been much more
prominent than in Tatarstan, due in part to
the substantially higher level of religiosity of
the population. Another reason is the much
deeper economic crisis, aggravated by Da-
gestan's close proximity to war-stricken and
intensively Islamicized Chechnya. Dagestani
society has relatively strong communal,
ethno-clan and religious ties which super-
sede individual rights and values. Most
Dagestanis are Sunnis of the Shafii rite, al-
though the Nogays of northern Dagestan
adhere to the Hanafi rite. It is also significant
that the majority of Dagestani Muslims pro-
fess mystical Islam Ð Sufism of Naqshbandi,
Shadhili, Dzhazuli, Kadiri, and Yasawi orders.
Local Sufism absorbed various pre-Islamic
beliefs and practices and became deeply in-
tegrated into the traditional community
system. As a result, there emerged a particu-
lar regional form of Sufism, known as
T a r i q a t i s m .
Compared to Tatarstan, in Dagestan Islam
has remained a pivotal social and cultural
regulator. Its survival, although mainly in its
popular Sufi form, is due to Dagestan's sig-
nificantly lower scale of industrialization, ur-
banization and resulting secularization, and
the overwhelming numerical superiority of
Muslims over non-Muslims. During the Sovi-
et period the traditional community and
clan-based Dagestani society absorbed So-
viet collectivism and Party centralism and
approximated the Islamic Communist model
advocated by Sultan-Galiev and other Islam-
ic Communists of the 1920s. Consequently,
the bulk of Dagestanis were devastated by
the break-up of the USSR and subsequent
de-Sovietization of Dagestan. Nonetheless,
the Soviet political system persisted in
Dagestan until 1995 and the Communists
maintained their popularity until the late
1990s, much longer than anywhere else in
Russia. 
The breakdown of the Soviet economic
and industrial complex and the drop in fed-
eral subsidies brought about extreme hard-
ships to Dagestanis, aggravated by the war
in neighbouring Chechnya. Among its worst
consequences have been the mass impov-
erishment and desolation, the spread of mil-
itary and terrorist activity on Dagestani ter-
ritory and the proliferation of a culture of vi-
olence and lawlessness. These factors have
created a fertile breeding ground for ex-
tremism, both religious and political. Like
Chechnya, Dagestan has been overwhelmed
by a wave of terrorism, including political
assassinations and kidnappings in return for
ransoms. 
The failure of ethno-nationalists to gener-
ate a viable opposition to the corrupt and
ineffective Dagestani government encour-
aged popular Islamic protest. This was chan-
nelled largely into the Islamic fundamental-
ist movement, known as Salafism, or Wah-
habism. By 1999 about 7 to 9% of Dagestani
Muslims had succumbed to the increasingly
popular Wahhabism. On several occasions
during the 1990s Wahhabi leaders demon-
strated their ability to mobilize their follow-
ers for the struggle against the injustice and
lawlessness associated with the ruling
regime. In response, the Dagestani authori-
ties opted for ruthless political and adminis-
trative suppression of Wahhabism altogeth-
er. 
The common anti-Wahhabi stance had
brought together the Dagestani government
and the Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul'man
Dagestana (DUMD, Spiritual Board of Mus-
lims of Dagestan), controlled by the Avar
ethnic party, and in particular, by the
Naqshbandi w i r d (t a r i q a branch) of Shaykh
Sayid-Efendi Aytseev (Chirkeevskii). In 1997,
as a result of pressure from the latter, the
authorities institutionalized Tariqatism as
the only legitimate and traditional form of
Islam in Dagestan, banning Wahhabism.
Many Wahhabi leaders were arrested, their
offices demolished and periodicals closed.
The Dagestan pro-government mass media
has launched an anti-Wahhabi propaganda
campaign, presenting Wahhabis exclusively
as foreign, mainly Saudi and British merce-
naries, despite the fact that many are in-
digenous Dagestanis. Furthermore, the term
Wahhabi has been applied to any represen-
tative of the opposition, irrespective of his
or her religious orientation.
This resolute anti-Wahhabi position of t h e
official authorities of Dagestan has also
been enhanced by the Chechen and Moscow
factors. The Dagestani authorities feared
that the proliferation of Wahhabism in
Dagestan would facilitate the Chechen radi-
cals' plan to unite Chechnya and Dagestan
into a single Islamic state, ruled by Wahhabi
Chechens. On the other hand, under the
conditions of protracted military conflict be-
tween Moscow and Chechnya, Dagestan's
official denunciation of Wahhabism has pro-
vided important leverage for the continuing
inflow of federal subsidies to Makhachkala.
For example, as a reward for their unam-
biguous support for Moscow during the
abortive Chechen-Wahhabi invasion of
Dagestan in August and September 1999,
federal financial support for the republic has
increased by 270%. Since then the leaders of
Dagestan have carefully attuned their
rhetoric and actions to the policies of Presi-
dent Putin, who tends to equate Wah-
habism with Islamic extremism and interna-
tional terrorism. 
The ongoing official physical and ideolog-
ical warfare against Wahhabism has secured
for Sufism the position of official traditional
Islam. However, given the deep interweav-
ing of Sufism with primordial social net-
works based on clan solidarity, it is unlikely
that it could provide a plausible ideological
framework for the future modernization
and democratization of Dagestani society.
Moreover, the prolongation of the current
economic and social disorder, on the one
hand, and the association of Sufism with a
semi-criminal and inefficient regime, on the
other, might continue to generate increas-
ing receptiveness to Salafi Islam, which
could come to be regarded as the last resort
for socially and economically alienated
members of the ex-Soviet Dagestani u m m a .
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In post-Soviet Tatarstan Islam has become
an organic part of the Tatar national revival.
Historically the ancestors of the modern
Tatars were Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi r i t e .
The Tatars' four-and-a-half centuries of exis-
tence within the Russian Orthodox political
and cultural environment has rendered
'Tatar' and 'Islam' practically synonymous.
The Islamic renaissance among Tatars has
been hampered by high levels of urbaniza-
tion and secularization, and the bi-national
nature of Tatarstan's society. These circum-
stances are responsible for the idea, among
dissident Tatar nationalists, of re-integrating
Islam into the fabric of Tatar society, repre-
sented by the Vsetatarskii Obshestvenni
Tsentr (VTOTS, All-Tatar Public Centre), the
party of Ittifaq (Union), Milli Mejlis (National
Assembly) and Azatlyk (Freedom). After the
abortive anti-Gorbachev coup d'tat in Au-
gust 1991, the Tatar nationalists received
carte blanche from Tatarstan President
Shaimiev, who manipulated them in order
to avoid inevitable repercussions from
Moscow due to his backing of the anti-
Yeltsin camp. 
During the period of amicable relations
between the official Tatar establishment
and the Tatar nationalists, lasting from
1989 till 1994, the government in Kazan
(capital of Tatarstan) responded favourably
to the nationalists' main Islam-related aspi-
rations. In particular, it encouraged the
emergence of a separate Islamic adminis-
tration Ð Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul'man
Respubliki Tatarstan (DUMRT, Islamic Spiri-
tual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan),
which declared its independence from the
all-Russian federal Islamic administration,
the Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul'man
Evropeiskoi Rossii i Sibiri (DUMES, Islamic
Spiritual Board of the European Part of Rus-
sia and Siberia), based in Ufa. 
The 1994 power-sharing treaty between
Moscow and Kazan, which secured wider au-
tonomy for the Tatarstan leadership, put an
end to the alliance between the establish-
ment and the Tatar nationalists. Shaimiev's
team opted for the formation of a democrat-
ically camouflaged, moderate ethnocratic
regime which necessitated the neutralization
of the Tatar national opposition. This includ-
ed the co-optation of the nationalists' most
intelligent representatives, the formation of
the official duplicate national organizations
and the incorporation of some nationalist
ideas into the official ideology. For example,
in opposition to the Milli Mejlis the Shaimiev
government sponsored the formation of a
tame Vsetatarskii Mezhdunarodnii Congress
(All-Tatar World Congress) under the leader-
ship of Indus Tagirov. It also appropriated na-
tionalist policies in areas such as language,
education, and especially religion (e.g.
restoration and building of mosques, open-
ing an Islamic University, Islamic colleges and
madrasas). 
